The Militia is and should be playing an increasing role in Army operations. We need to reflect on this reality and adapt to a changing Regular/Reserve balance. Regular Force brigade commanders and COs should take every opportunity to incorporate Militia personnel, both as individuals and in formed sub-units, into their training. We should learn to creatively accommodate the inherent challenges while valuing Militia involvement in training and operations. We have all seen Regular Force units welcome, train and integrate up to 30 per cent of their unit strength for operational deployments. Through sound planning, employing common sense and by setting and ensuring high standards those units usually achieve notable success and complete the operation with a high degree of professionalism and pride. Wise COs know how to capitalize on the strengths of Reservists, accommodate their inherent limitations, and build cohesive and proficient teams.

In the absence of a mobilization concept for the Army it is a great challenge to determine the expected training requirements for Reserve units, other than to try to be like clones of the Regular Force but without the resources, equipment, personnel or collective experience. Resolving this dilemma will be a major undertaking for the Army, but other countries seem to be able to do so. Perhaps part of the solution is to concentrate largely on quality individual training and training up to and including platoon level - with annual experiences in higher level (e.g., battle group) exercises. No matter how difficult, individuals and commanders in the Militia must be exposed to realistic operational training. So, perhaps the aim should be to master platoon-level training and be exposed to company and battle group operations. Then use computer-based training and war gaming to assist Militia leaders to better learn and execute their leadership responsibilities.

Much of the Militia training can take place in and about their communities with the scenarios being modified accordingly. They don't necessarily need all of the equipment, ammunition, range time and consumables that the Regular Force units might require. In fact, if Reservists are needed on short notice they may not get those resources anyway. Instead the Militia must concentrate on leadership, battle procedure, command and control, communications and tactical drills, for example, and train collectively at platoon level. These fundamentals will stand the Militia units in good order no matter what the task assigned might be. I guess what I am saying is that it would be unrealistic to see the Militia as well-equipped and resourced as the Regular Force in peace time, but not having all the bells and whistles should not be an excuse for not doing proper training. The focus and the extent of training, should be adjusted but commanders should not violate the principles, the flow and the doctrinal base.

If the Militia to is to play a meaningful and productive role in the Canadian Army mobilization plan, which it must, it is critical that their training be adequate to the demands of the particular stage of mobilization. In the early stages they obviously need sound individual training, adequate trades training, high quality leadership training, a sound foundation in tactical doctrine and proficient platoons. They can only achieve these levels through training on the armoury floor and in sub-unit tactical exercises. The rank and file must have shared experiences in realistic tactical scenarios, otherwise the unit roles and functions would seem to be out of sync. The officers and NCOs require good training in tactical theory and drills, and need to be evaluated in unit training - mostly through tactical exercises without troops and simulation but also in the field.

At higher stages of mobilization sub-units and units must be trained to take on those tasks within their capabilities. Initially these would be set-piece tasks, but as the requirements increase they would be much more demanding, with better equipment. Some sub-units or units could be re-roled, which amplifies the need to build from a sound foundation.

At the still higher stages of mobilization Militia units would be expected to function tactically within formations, with operational tasks appropriate to the equipments they have - such as light infantry, rear area security, general support artillery and functional support units.

To achieve any semblance of the above a mobilization plan must give considerable guidance on and direction regarding the subject of training. For Militia training to be viable and effective it must incorporate:

More than anything, effective and useful Militia training must be connected to the army mobilization concept, and must incorporate the guidance and resources appropriate for that which is expected. The Militia clearly needs meaningful roles, missions and tasks, along with the requisite equipment for training.

REALISM

LIVE FIRE IN TRAINING

It may seem a bit curious to the reader that I would leave the subject of live fire so late in the discussion. I firmly believe that live fire exercises with service ammunition are an essential component of training; but not nearly to the extent we have employed them in the past. My experience has been that live fire' opportunities can be put to much better use. It seems logical that if we know what we want to achieve and we know what standards are expected, then we should be able to determine the requirements and use the ammunition efficiently and effectively. Frequently better training in drills, tactics, camouflage and maneuver can be achieved with much less ammunition than in the past, and certainly with advanced weapons simulation and improved training technologies this will be all the more so in the future. Still, there is a great deal to be gained by soldiers participating in well-structured field tiring exercises.

Clearly, all individuals must be proficient with their personal and crew-served weapons and the annual requirements for this can be easily determined. Additionally all ranks should be familiar with the complete arsenal of unit weapons which might be available to them and familiarization live fire must be undertaken. Section, platoon and company-level live fire exercises according to the specified battle task standards arc also essential on an annual basis (and the same applies to tank squadrons and artillery batteries as well as combat teams) but only as a culmination to all the other preparatory activities. Regimental, i.e., unit, live fire is needed by the artillery for that is the level at which the artillery begins to fight, but mastering combat team live fire is as high as one might expect for armour and infantry. Establish bona fide requirements, then provide the resources.

Training for specific operations measured against accepted and well understood standards will normally demand a specific ammunition allocation. Training staffs should have appropriate scales on hand for such eventualities and the allocations should be automatic and additional to the routine annual scales. We have all seen the two extremes, i.e., units unable to train for a mission because they haven't been given the spending authorities, and units pump ing thousands of rounds down range (and millions of dollars) for a mission in which the aim is to not fire a single round in anger! These are important command (not staff) decisions, requiring rigorous estimates and plans.

TRAINING FOR UN AND OTHER SPECIFIC MISSIONS

Specific-to-mission or specific-to-theatre operations (such as operations other than war and domestic operations) require special attention to the training and the evaluation of committed units. Even though the focus of Army training should be on warfighting, this should not be the only training given to units in preparation for peace support or other non-traditional missions. Yet one must keep in mind that if a unit has no warfighting capability it will not be respected by either its allied forces or the protagonists. Train high to deal with the unforseen.

See Appendix 4, which depicts a model of training progression for a specific operational mission.

Much has been written about UN training in the recent past. “There is a sense that the Army continues to do everything in an ad hoc manner and thus make do, relying almost entirely on “general-purpose/multi-purpose combat training” as the principal way to train for any operation. From a broad perspective and under most conditions this concept suffices, but specific-to-theatre and specific-to-mission training is also required. The Army should create standardized training plans with appropriate scenarios and make these essential for unit preparation.

Additionally, expert training teams should be constituted to assist in developing, conducting and evaluating specific-to-mission training. Such measures would undoubtedly assist in ensuring common doctrine and practices while improving our ability to learn from others.

Of course training should not end when the troops get on the bus, train or plane. There are numerous historical examples of continuing and continuous training of troops in-theatre in war. It was noted in World War Two - “When German units were not in the line, they trained long and hard”. There must be continuous learning, adaptation, modification, adjustment and re-training once in theatre. Other, less mission-specific types of training should also continue whenever opportunities permit - e.g., trade/MOC courses, R.O.E. Refreshers, First Aid, new skills, etc. Commanders at all levels should ensure the creation of a continuous learning atmosphere to relieve boredom, maintain proficiency, encourage self-development and improve operational efficiency.

I recommend that you read the LaRose-Edwards, Dangerfield, Weekes Study on “Non-traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers;' produced for the Somalia Inquiry.

HIGHER LEVEL DOCTRINE AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

“In April 1941 lie (Brooke, British CIGS) recorded lie was ‘depressed at the standard of training and efficiency of Canadian Divisional and Brigade Commanders. A great pity to see such excellent material as the Canadian men controlled by such indifferent commanders’.” 17

Obviously there are limited opportunities for the examination and experience of higher level doctrine for Senior and General officers of the Canadian Army. Walking the ground and discussing tactics, like the studies/ reconnaissances in Norway and battlefield studies of Normandy and the Gothic Line are examples of relating current doctrine to ground and also learning from our predecessors. Immediately after the Second World War the British Imperial Defence College did battlefield tours of major Canadian battles of the War (e.g. Operation TOTALIZE), however we chose not to do the same until several generations later. The Gulf War, Oka and even Bosnia and Somalia have yet to be studied in detail by Army Generals. Additionally, the voluminous after-action reports produced these days are not particularly instructive as they tend to report in excessive detail, conflicting opinions and just generally miss the point. It is tremendously important that the senior officers of the Army take time to reflect on their profession, thereby maintaining a body of knowledge at the higher level of operations. It is equally important that they pass on their thoughts to the next generation in a free exchange of ideas.

Participating in major operational studies, battlefield tours, field exercises and CPXs of our allies would also be instructive, but only if approached from the view of maintaining our professional knowledge, which would entail documenting and bringing back lessons to include in the doctrine and/or the writing of professional papers. Everyone should document their experiences, especially senior officers.

“Lack of operational focus further hastened the eclipse of Canadian military professionalism between the wars. Instead of retrenching anywhere near realistically as had the Reichsheer of von Seeckt, which stressed theoretical training for war, the Canadian regular force ... catered to politicians who, as blind as their electorates, could not envision another conflict. ... Institutionally, there was no provision for keeping the art of war fighting alive.”18

COLLECTIVE TRAINING AT BRIGADE AND HIGHER LEVELS

Collective training at brigade level and above is absolutely essential and must be conducted on a regular basis, at least annually. Joint and combined training is also required to develop and maintain the necessary capabilities of higher formation headquarters to co-ordinate and utilize the capabilities of support arms as well as the other services and environments and other nations. Although not the focus of this booklet, brigade group and higher level training, as well as joint and combined training, are fundamental to the professional development of officers, warrant officers and NCOs. They are also fundamental to inter-operability with our allies.

Orchestrating experiences in higher level training is important. All too often it is begun before units and brigades have mastered the basics of their profession - the specified battle task standards.

This is normally a costly and counter-productive error. Before launching into higher level training commanders should reflect and consider how the general principles set out in this booklet can be utilized at all levels of training.

At the formation level it takes a most skillfully planned and executed field exercise to challenge and benefit all echelons, including the soldiers, at the same time and all of the time. In fact I don't believe it can be done effectively. Much as this might be an ideal intent, commanders really have to focus on what they intend to achieve while not wasting the soldiers' time and all the associated expense.

CONCENTRATIONS

Concentrations such as the RENDEZVOUS (RV) series of exercises are critical to the operational effectiveness of the Army, just as ships going to sea and airplanes flying are to the Navy and Air Force. A Divisional-level exercise is required every two to three years, with brigades being exercised by an outside authority at least every second year. Eight to ten weeks, as we used to do, may not be necessary if preliminary training is more thorough and more seriously evaluated. Certainly the old philosophy of moving the garrison to the field is no longer acceptable. I even remember running a mess dinner in the field, thinking that was a clever thing to do! Which it wasn't.

Concentrate we must. Focus. Get the job done and get home. But while you are there be sure that you get the job done. The culmination of one Rendezvous exercise was a brigade attack against the other brigade. Although it was a great event and almost every sub-component of the brigades were simultaneously engaged in fighting, the co-ordination, synchronization and effective application of force left much to be desired. If our aim really was to exercise the brigades we should have gone back to the respective lines of departure and started again - but then again the trains were booked to take us home the next day.

My point is, concentrate when appropriate, then use the opportunity to its fullest.

Militia concentrations have had very mixed results in past years, primarily because the purpose and the realities were not fully examined in the planning stage. Pretending to run Militia brigade-level exercises by manoeuvring battalions around, has produced few good results. Some company-level concentrations, where each company, battery and squadron went through modified battle task standards, have been much more productive. Perhaps that is the best level at which we might expect a degree of cohesion and where special-to-arm activities can be consolidated - and where a sense of accomplishment can be achieved - i.e., good platoons in a company scenario.

Still, the psychological impact of pulling all of the companies together, all the units together and all the arms and services together - and running a large-scale final tactical event is great for the Militia soldiers and officers. It helps to give them a clear, visible and memorable reminder of the purpose of the Army is all about. Perhaps some of this can be achieved through the participation of Militia sub-units and key commanders in the Regular Force formation exercises.

My main point is that the aim, the desirable/achievable objectives, the level of supporting effort and the degree of preliminary training must all be thoroughly considered before a major concentration is planned. Don't just concentrate for the sake of seeing large numbers of troops in the field: that's a waste of time and resources.

A NATIONAL TRAINING CENTRE

A national training centre with state-of-the-art simulation, and training teams equipped with a full complement of modern, operational, war-fighting equipment is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of a war fighting capability in the Canadian Army. Each combat team in the Army should rotate through such a centre once every two years and perhaps three or four battle group headquarters could rotate through annually.

Some say that we should have had a national training centre for several years, and others might suggest that three ad hoc training facilities would be better. Give the high level of commitment to operations other than war and to domestic operations, as well as the limitations inherent in our operational equipments, and the low experience levels and inadequacy of training resources in the brigades, the only way the Army can maintain a doctrinal base and a reasonable degree of proficiency in combat operations will be through a properly constituted national training centre.

Some of the key features of a national training centre include the existence of

Would such a training centre take away some of the authority and responsibility from commanders? Not necessarily, and only if they allowed it: In fact it would give commanders more opportunity to dedicate their energies to the essentials of training and not spend so much time and effort in organizing ad hoc arrangements. Would the costs in terms of personnel and equipment be exorbitant? Not likely, in comparison to the costs of maintaining dispersed and mixed fleets of operational equipments. Certainly the two national training centres in Canada - British and German - provide exceptional training opportunities for foreign units and battle groups. We should have our own.

PATROLLING AS A TRAINING ACTIVITY

Perhaps no training activity is as effective in training sub-units and junior leaders as is patrolling. All arms and services will be called upon to patrol in virtually all types of military environment - e.g., civil assistance, aid of civil power, peacekeeping, rear area security, local defence and warfighting, and in all types of weather and terrain. Reconnaissance patrols and fighting patrols particularly contain all the essentials of battle procedure and provide a focus for Non-commissioned and Junior Officers far more concentrated than any other activity. They demand careful planning, coordinated effort, all-arms cooperation, skillful execution and team effort. They serve particularly well as vehicles for leadership training at section and platoon level - where every decision and action of the leader is totally transparent through the consequences, making it ideally suited to the after-action review process. They are good for individual fieldcraft, competitive spirit, sub-unit morale and as an example for. the basics of higher level operations. For these and other reasons patrolling is a highly flexible, versatile and demanding activity to be exploited for its training value.

Training in the many aspects of patrolling can be conducted in urban or rural environments, peace support or war scenarios, with or without sophisticated simulation, for short periods or long, while mounted or foot-borne, with low levels of activity or high, with meagre resources or abundant, and with small (2-3 person) or large (platoon/platoon plus other arms) teams. Patrolling exercises can be relatively easy to organize (at least the simple ones are) and they do not normally call for a great amount of resources.

Some people enjoy conducting “Entebbe-type” raids (e.g., company size) as a training activity. I think that the dedication and expenditure of so many resources to such a brief and rare activity is of marginal training value, especially in comparison to the other essential training. Other forms of training essential to the coy level are a better use of resources. For specialized units perhaps, but as a normal training activity - no.

As Farley Mowat said in “The Regiment”: “During the first three months of 1944 (in the Italy campaign), it was the patrols that carried the heaviest load ... Day by day, night by night they went out. Fighting patrols, reconnaissance patrols, ambush patrols, standing patrols - there was no end to the patrol duties.” Patrolling remains an essential part of military activity: e.g., in Bosnia, Oka, Ice Storm ‘98, Peggy's Cove or searches for a lost child. All units must train in patrolling and patrol training is a superb training vehicle for greater purposes. But, keep in mind that operations of war do not happen in two or three day packages, so patrol training can give false lessons if not handled carefully.

SPECIAL AND ADVENTURE TRAINING

Training in a variety of weather, terrain and environments is important and should be accounted for in training plans. In principle, commanders should also be supportive of special and adventure training. This support should be conditional upon the proposed training not interfering with the achieving basic competencies in the unit.

There are many obvious advantages to be derived from adventure training. Commanders need to weigh advantages against costs (in terms of lost training time to the primary combat functions). It seems that both the British and German Armies often do much better adventure training in Canada than the Canadian Army does. We can do better and should encourage junior leaders to take full advantage of the opportunities. Special considerations should be applied to adventure training, including the following stipulations: it should take place in Canada, ideally involve an aboriginal community or tie in with the Canadian Rangers, and it should not cost much. Certainly training in Canada should get priority over that conducted: in more exotic and expensive locales. Providing numerous good opportunities for corporals and privates should take precedence over spending a lot of money looking after a few prima donnas. I used the following test as a guide: Does it develop leaders? Does it stretch the soldiers - mentally as well as physically? Is it in Canada? Is it modest in terms of cost, i.e. would taxpayers think so? Will the troops enjoy it, and be challenged and encouraged by it? and, (one I always added in because I believe we can and should have much more contact with our First Nations people) does it include Canadian Rangers or aboriginal communities?

If it meets many or most of these criteria, then I would give it priority over biking across Europe in colourful spandex pants.

I do not consider mountain schools and ski schools (to include cross-country) to be adventure training per se, although they can no doubt provide a few moments excitement and panic! They certainly are good for small unit morale, detract from operational training however” and regrettably we don't seem to be very good at employing the techniques learned in subsequent exercises. I would encourage more of the latter, and exploit this speciality training in tactical exercises. Because I really think that these are excellent military activities, which we tend to turn into purely recreational activities rather than military ones. As Canadians we should know how to fight in our own forests, on our mountains and over tundra.

SMALL UNIT EXCHANGES

In the past it seemed that many small unit exchanges were fun but didn't have much of a return. Of necessity, this has to change. Given that we are no longer as closely tied in with the training of our allies in NATO and we don't have the first-rate warfighting equipment that many of our allies have it is all the more critical that we conduct exchanges. If we are to maintain a sense of what it is like to operate within large formations and if we wish to maintain familiarization with other countries' equipments we might need upon mobilization, then it will be through exchanges that we maintain this knowledge. It will also be through exchanges that we keep abreast of doctrine, equipments and procedures, and that we maintain contact with the personalities with whom we might have to serve in operations.

Perhaps battalion-level organizations should get a company-sized small unit exchange every second year and no more. However, such exchanges must be extremely well thought-out to ensure that they produce good training value.

COMPETITIONS

“A leader without a sense of competition is weak and easily overcome by the slightest challenge.”

Soldiers are by nature competitive and thankfully so. Units are as well and this is essential to a healthy environment and good morale. Training events such as “Skill-at-Arms” days, “Iron Man” and “Mountain Man” competitions, Patrol Competitions, Small Arms Competitions, biathalons and like events, can provide a healthy spirit of competition and serve as training vehicles. Alternatively, they can also foster ill will and unethical behaviour, and can waste valuable time and resources if not properly devised. Recognize these events for what they are and plan for them very carefully, especially from the perspective of the psychological impact they may have on units and individuals. Are they to be “fun” events? Are they to encourage leadership? Are they to encourage individual stamina and allow an opportunity for Private soldiers to excel? Think these questions through and be sure of the objective before plan- excel? Think these questions through and be sure of the objective before planning the events. If they are to be fun, then make them so and give out prizes (not unit trophies) which reflect this emphasis. If the purpose is to encourage team spirit or skill with weapons, then make sure the competitions reflect the physical capabilities you are trying to encourage. We want robust soldiers who are physically and mentally tough and who don't give up in adversity - so concentrate on those activities which best produce these qualities.

SPORTS AS A TRAINING ACTIVITY

Sporting events are a part of our history, customs and way of life in the Canadian Army. They should be incorporated in the training plan when ever possible. They sometimes seem to consume more energy than desirable - but in the army, you can't do without them. Sports activities build self-confidence, challenge the soldiers, teach leadership, and build unit cohesion. Frequent sub-unit competitions generate more participation, good spirit and enthusiasm than do the more high profile inter-unit events, especially when taskings arc as heavy as in today's Army. But, whenever possible, it is great to have inter-unit hockey (first priority), soccer, baseball, rugby, volleyball and other sports. However, don't force soldiers to participate if they haven't got a hope of winning. The days of specialized teams of professional jocks are gone, and teams made up on the spot can be just as much fun and equally entertaining. Maximum participation should be the guiding rule (as long as you sometimes win).

Fostering fitness and a competitive spirit is important, but do not treat competitions lightly as they can be counter-productive to training and can produce unwanted results. Planned wisely, they enhance training and foster good soldierly spirit and strong unit morale.

“High morale is allied with physical fitness; the soldier cannot be mentally f t for battle unless he is physically fit. “ 19

VIPS AND OTHER VISITORS

VIPs will visit units and brigades from time to time - and as much as this might be a pain, such visits are going to happen anyway. Rather than run set-piece demonstrations it is preferable that they visit ongoing training. In principle, one should not have to disrupt the training for VIPs. But, commanders will want visits to go well and be interesting and informative for the VIP - so it may be necessary to orchestrate activities accordingly. If commanders at all levels use a bit of imagination they should be able to achieve the aim with a minimum expenditure of additional energy. Brigade commanders should always call for the plan and activities in advance and will normally want to see a rehearsal or at least walk the ground. If a commander is comfortable with a particular unit, he may forego detailed rehearsals, but he should always request briefings in advance and should always get out to walk the ground.

Of course efforts should be made to keep the number of visits to a minimum and if they are senior Canadian officers they don't necessarily need the proverbial 'dog and pony' show. Let them get their feet dirty and mill about with the troops - they will get more out of it, as will the soldiers and junior officers who can show off what they are doing and maybe have a good chat.

THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC

“Increasingly, Canadians were becoming tired of King's all-talk, no action approach to the war Criticism about the Canadian Army's continued inactivity was coming from every quarter now. Newspaper editorials and opposition MPs seized on the growing call for action. 'It seems an awful thing to say,' a senior officer at CMHQ remarked at the time to Colonel Charles Stacey, 'but the people of Canada are calling out for blood’.” 20 - BGen & Shelagh Whitaker Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph

Blood they got, on the beaches of Dieppe. This was not to be the first nor last time that public opinion, influenced by the media, caused the government of the day and/or senior officers to make or condone costly military decisions. Certainly today the power of the media to influence world opinion and cause nations to act is remarkable - and the power over the Canadian Forces is evident daily.

Effective communications with the public is surely the Eleventh Principle of War these days, but we have been slow to recognize it. We surely fumbled it through much of the early and mid-1990s, which indicates that we have been on a shaky foundation for some time.

Media involvement in operations is to be expected, and additionally journalists have a genuine interest in many aspects of training. They should be encouraged to get involved in all types of training, both as participants, i.e., role-playing, thereby contributing to professional development, and also for the purposes of real-life coverage.

Mr. David Pugliese of the Ottawa Citizen has offered the Army, in various speeches and articles, several tips on dealing with the media. One may detect a sense of frustration in Mr. Pugliese's suggestions, but such attitudes are not confined to him. The reader may not agree with what he has to say, but it would be well worth while paying attention to his opinions for these reflect those of many of the journalists they will have to deal with. One should prepare for this in training. His comments on the Canadian Forces and military-media relations are as follows:

Mr. Pulgiese uses the example of one senior officer who summed up things pretty good when he said: “ If you don't want to be on the front page doing stupid things, then don't do stupid things in the first place.”

Attached at Appendix 5 is an article by Peter Worthington, of the Toronto Sun, entitled “Know Thine Enemy.” Again, readers may not agree with the author's viewpoint - but it is worth heeding. He concludes his article with an assertion that the media is important in enabling an army to be understood and to do its job. Training with and of the media, and training for military-media relations will prepare the army for that eleventh Principle of War - effective mass communications to Canadians. Having read Peter Worthington's article, readers might want to ask themselves: “Who is the enemy?”!

MILITARY-CIVIL CONTACT

For too long our forces have been cloistered inside military fortresses and have lost touch with mainstream Canada. This is a peacetime phenomena particularly evident during the Cold War and post-Viet Nam eras. (Fortunately the Militia helped maintain our links to Canadian Society, as did the Cadet movement.) More recently, floods, ice storms and other disasters have caused the Army to venture forth and be seen, but tremendous damage has been done because of the period of paranoia. The creation of mega-bases demand an even greater effort to remain in touch with the nation.

Commanders must make the time and effort to ensure a degree of contact between soldiers and ordinary Canadians, and one way is through innovative training activities. Even ceremonial events can have tremendous training value. The battle procedure involved in putting on a Military Tattoo or a `Freedom of the City' event can be every bit as complex as an exercise or operation. The public then gets to see the efficiency, effectiveness and professionalism of their soldiers and the quality of their training.

In spite of the inherent complexities and difficulties, periodically training on civilian property can be a great activity and I highly recommend it. Note that some activities can't be exercised, but sometimes some unique ones can - and soldiers have to learn to be flexible. Again, these are unique opportunities for taxpayers to see their troops in action and maybe also play a part. , Most Canadians are supportive of their soldiers and enjoy seeing them close at hand.

PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS

Publishing papers on matters of interest and concern to our profession should he encouraged, particularly with respect to our training and doctrine. A confident and values-based profession can encourage and accept internal critique. Members of the profession should be comfortable withstanding the scrutiny of fellow members. A professional journal which stimulates discussion can benefit the Army and help produce better doctrine, better training, better tactical practices and better leaders.

How we encourage junior officers to write without fear of repercussions is a dilemma. How we get senior officers to give thought to the major issues and publish their thoughts is equally a problem. Can we permit anonymous papers? Or will it help to have high-priced editorial boards to select “suitable” papers to be published? What are the consequences of going public on highly controversial matters? I do not have the answers - but I do know the consequences of not acting when problems are perceived: professional stagnation and the persistence of the problems. If we developed into a learning organization with a healthy respect for fellow professionals, and if we encouraged self-analysis, then presumably these issues would evaporate. Other armies have done it and presumably we should be able to do likewise.

THE REAL WORLD

It is easy to become totally engrossed in the training of a unit while ignoring the “real world,” especially with our soldiers experiencing multiple operational tours. COs must keep in mind that the soldiers have family lives and that often they participate in community activities - or sometimes have second jobs or are taking educational programs. For these reasons training (or travel) should not be scheduled on weekends unless it is absolutely essential. Occasionally prolonged periods of training are essential. Unit training plans should incorporate opportunities to occasionally give families the chance to see their soldiers in training. Invite journalists, business and community leaders to see and participate in training. In other words, keep in touch with the “real world.”

To keep spouses informed I ensured that each soldier got a quarterly aide -memoire version of the annual training plan plus a quarterly training calendar. I soon found out that these never did get to the intended family member and thus I found it necessary to have second copies delivered to the homes. Keeping the soldiers and their families informed, and sticking to it, will go a long way toward allowing the troops to live a semblance of a normal life - at least give them some control over their personal lives.

Perhaps the solution is to offer the troops a certain degree of predictability. Establish quite clearly those matters which are of vital importance, plan well ahead, create and follow a sound set of ground rules, establish routines, keep the soldiers informed, and encourage dialogue. Also make a concerted effort to identify and eliminate the “least-effective training.”

The “Real World” of the Militia also includes their employer, potential employers, school or community leaders and the members of the community they deal with. If these influential people are not familiar with and sympathetic to the demands placed on Reservists then the individuals must struggle to get their support just to find time to train. On the other hand, the more these constituents learn of the quality of training and development offered by the Militia, the more likely they are to be supportive and helpful. Executive stretch exercises, visits to the units, and opportunities to get a sense of the training should be offered to these key people - who in turn will be supportive of the individuals in the Army as well as supporting the Army as a valued Canadian institution.

“The care of your men in all-circumstances, whether they are temporarily or permanently under your care is your first and last consideration. Any dereliction in that regard will cause justifiable wrath.” 21 - Major W.A.S. Dunlop The Fighting Soldier, 1940

TRAINING SHOULD BE FUN!

How dare I say such a thing in this resource-constrained, heavily tasked, politically correct environment of today's Army. Well, when soldiering stops being fun we will lose many a good soldier, and that is regrettable. After all, the army is a very human, people-oriented calling. We live, work, train, fight and face hardships and unlimited liability together. We have to want to be together and not only keep the team going, but succeed as a team. If there wasn't some fun, some humour and some humanity in our training then we would be a sorry lot indeed and we would most certainly could not withstand the pressures of operations and war. We might as well go work at a bank or a factory! One only needs to read books such as George Blackburn's trilogy, or those by Denis Whitaker and Farley Mowat to grasp how important the human element is in training and operations. So, don't be afraid to make some aspects of training fun. Besides, as an old friend used to say: “They're not shooting at you, are they?” - or at least they shouldn't be. On the other hand, another friend said that: “Training shouldn't be a popularity contest!” They're both right.

RECOGNIZING SUCCESS

Just as honours and awards are important psychological reinforcers in operations and war, so too are they in training. They should take on a different form however: A few words of praise may be all that is required, and telling the troops why they earned the day off will help. The achievement of high standards, innovation, efficiency, new tactics and better support to training are examples of performances which would warrant recognition and the conduct of high quality training should be considered of such significance that is worthy of praise.