SET THE GOALS, DON'T SET OUT ALL THE DETAILS

Without producing a lot of paper, commanders at all levels should:

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PERMIT FREEDOM OF ACTION

Having set the scene and established the training goals and objectives to achieve specific goals or to overcome specific weakness, COs should allow subordinates some freedom in how they achieve their goals. This applies at all levels of command thus developing and reinforcing subordinates' leadership skills and confidence. Encourage and reward innovation, as long as sound results are achieved. Innovation and initiative will carry the day in operations, so make a conscious effort to develop these qualities in training. But challenge innovators and if necessary, push them.

DELEGATE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

“I am a believer in telling a man what I want done, but not how to do it. if an officer has doubts as to the best method of doing the task, I am glad to render him any assistance within my capabilities.”
- General Frank Worthington, Pacific Coast Area “Instructions to Officers” 1949

Permit subordinates and their subordinates, especially lieutenants, captains and warrant officers to create, organize and run training. They must be allowed to develop as leaders and must be given the opportunity to learn from their successes and mistakes. Of course, once given this opportunity and the necessary resources, subordinates will be expected to produce good results and should be held accountable for their decisions and the attainment of standards. Care must be exercised in supervising inexperienced leaders to ensure that, while given latitude to make mistakes, soldiers do not suffer and false lessons are not taught. Ultimate responsibility to produce well-trained units cannot be delegated. He who has the guidelines, is given the resources and oversees the training, is accountable.

ENCOURAGE INITIATIVE, IMAGINATION AND INGENUITY

One of those willing to face the facts (that the Germans were winning because of superior tactics, and not blaming equipment or Allies) is a professional soldier Lt-Col Frank Worthington ... fired up by stories filtering back across the Atlantic about lightning strikes of German columns, he decides to arrange an unusual experiment with a mobile column charging around the rural countryside of Western Ontario ... a mobile column led by one company of medium tanks, followed by infantry in trucks, and field guns on wheels bringing up the rear. 10
- George Blackburn
Where the Hell Are the Guns

As a young captain, along with several other officers, I was encouraged by my battery commander to create new doctrine for the tactical employment of self-propelled M109 Howitzers, which had yet to come into service. Using tracked ammunition carriers to simulate the self-propelled howitzers, we created concepts of “Rolling RVs”, pre-surveyed crash deployment gun positions and alternates, and the passage of abbreviated firing orders over the radio on the move-ideas which are now (some 30 years later) beginning to be employed by the U.S. artillery with their on-board computers, position indicators and secure radios. The battery commander challenged us, he made us think about our profession and he caused us to challenge not only “the book” but our NCOs and soldiers as well. Another example is the tremendous work another battery commander did to develop and implement innovative tactical doctrine on the integration of the fire of guns and mortars - “Integrated Indirect Fire Support.” We brought the training of the brigade's infantry mortars up to new and higher standards, but more importantly, we synchronized the guns and mortars to provide greatly improved fire support for the brigade. Innovation and the evolution of doctrine and tactics must be encouraged by commanders. Generate intellectual curiosity and ingenuity.

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GO FOR THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY

“If sub-unit (company, platoon, section) training is not good you will fail in battle, however good your higher training.”
- Montgomery

As Von Clausewitz has said, the centre of gravity is the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. It is the point against which all our energies should be directed. In collective training for the Canadian Army I believe that the centre of gravity is the combat team. Combat teams, not companies/squadrons/batteries, are the sub-units that make up battle groups. Combat teams are the level at which the firepower, manoeuvre and tactical agility best come together, and the combat team becomes the major building block of battle group. Any number of combat teams can come under the command of experienced COs, who themselves have previously commanded combat teams and who now have the responsibility of coordinating all of the combat functions while managing significant resources. With the combat team as the centre of gravity, then all of our training should focus on ensuring that combat teams are well trained, evaluated and prepared for operations.

In the British, German, and U.S. Armies, the emphasis is at B.G. level, as seen in Suffield, Shilo and the U.S. National Training Centres. However, given the particular circumstance facing Canada the combat team would be the level at which we could best muster resources for first-class training - but this would have to change in training for war. The centre of gravity for Militia training in peacetime, for many reasons, would be the platoon level. This is the largest cohesive team which commanders should expect to find trained to a high degree of proficiency in the greatest number of battle task standards. In preparation for operations though, it would be the combat team.

Concentrating energies on assuring that the centre of gravity is mastered does not preclude other training when resources and opportunities permit. In fact annual battle group training in specified battle task standards is tremendously important and higher formation training on a regular basis is fundamental to maintaining a professional focus. But the greatest energy should be focussed on well-trained and highly proficient combat teams.

If we don't focus on a centre of gravity we are never going to achieve significant success and keep the profession alive and focussed.

Note: These previous five bullets sound a lot like Auftragstaktik, or the 'mission- oriented command system' of the tradition of Scharnhorst and Moltke. Successful armies do not turn their troops into automatons nor try to control them from the top, instead they allow considerable latitude, focussed on the far-reaching object. A prerequisite for employing auftragstaklik, of course, is that subordinates must be well trained with a sound understanding of the appropriate doctrine. If we practice Auftragstaktik in training we will be more likely to employ it in operations.

ONE COMMON AND HIGH STANDARD

Battle task standards are covered elsewhere, and of course one needs to know what is expected of them before setting out on their training. However, across the Army, amongst all soldiers irrespective of their trade, unit or specific employment there should be one common and high standard expected, especially in subjects such as:

These subjects should be covered in all units before progressing to the functional tasks of the unit, and they should be common to all junior NCOs and junior officers, no matter their trade or classification. Individual training standards are required, but what I am suggesting here deals with teams, sections, troops, platoons and company equivalents across the Army.

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ONLY PRACTICE CAN MAKE PERFECT

It is only through practice that commanders and their soldiers will achieve a high degree of professionalism and soldiering skill. The study of history books and doctrine manuals, together with participation in war games, simulations and TEWTs develops professional competence up to a point. But only putting the theory into practice during training in the field provides the realism and the imponderables which lead to analysis, innovation and learning. Field training exercises, irrespective of cost or effort demanded, are essential to . good training. One cannot learn how to fight in war on game boards or from books. Even just learning how much terrain a combat team needs to manoeuvre or how fast it can move can only be learned by doing. The Combat Team Commanders Course has always offered opportunities to practice with the complete Combat Team-and this must be retained.

“What we have to learn to do, we learn by doing.”, -Aristotle

SET TACTICAL SCENARIOS

For realistic collective training, commanders must establish a tactical scenario, in which there is the presence of other arms and services and higher levels of command. An exercise for the sake of an exercise or a battle run without the broader context is not particularly inspiring. Commanders should not, however, waste a lot of maps and paper on unnecessarily elaborate scenarios that officers do not read and soldiers do not care about. We have all seen the waste of paper in elaborate TEWTs and CPXs which ended up shelved to collect dust. Without a tactical scenario exercises are meaningless.. Besides, just painting the picture is a good mental exercise for officers.

INCLUDE THE OTHER ARMS AND SERVICES

As often as possible, affiliated arms and services should be incorporated into all levels of training, particularly when training officers and NCOs. If possible, permit soldiers from the other arms and services to fill unit positions during exercises. No battles are won without the synergy of the all-arms team. Units that train together, strike up affiliations and friendships and iron out standard operating procedures together will function better as all-arms teams under the stresses and pressures of operations. Additionally, the more we all learn from each other, the better we can employ each others' combat and support functions, and the greater flexibility we have in preparing our people for any contingencies. As the nature of warfare evolves the clear lines of demarcation between arms, regiments, specialties, etc, will blur, so there is an imperative to learn about each other now that the time is available.

This paragraph from Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Tuker's book “Approach to Battle,” commenting on the Eighth Army in North Africa, is worthy of note:

“But this was the first time in war that we British had the chance, and failed, to train our battalions and our armoured squadrons and artillery batteries, our infantry sections or platoons and our single tanks or pairs or troops of tanks and our sections of field and anti-tank artillery, to work closely together right up in front in aggressive, mobile infiltrations. Whatever form our arms may yet take, they must be trained closely together in peace, from the very smallest sub-unit up to the very largest. Never again must they drift apart and never again must any of them - or for that matter, any of the three Fighting Services - become a `sacred cow’.” 11

Certainly in the 1960s in Germany, with some very impressive and capable battery commanders, many of us spent almost as much time with the infantry as with our own troops and to this day I still have many friends in the RCR, believe it or not.

USE OUTSIDERS TO ASSIST IN TRAINING

It can be helpful to have outside teams (e.g., from other units/companies, school representatives, HQ staffs, etc) assist commanders in evaluating training and providing objective critiques. The outsiders must, however, be made well aware that they are working for the CO or commander and with the unit. It would be absolutely counter-productive for these opportunities to become adversarial or self-serving in character.

The Instructor-In-Gunnery, or IG, system in the artillery has proven most effective over the years. An IG Team is deployed to assist unit COs, pass on the latest doctrine and drills, ensure common standards and report (principally to the CO, but also to the school, branch director and brigade commander) on the technical and tactical state of the unit. On several occasions as a young captain I led an IG team to a unit, and twice after reporting directly to the CO I had to stop it from conducting what I considered unsafe practices. The trust and confidence was there to accept my judgement and the training benefitted accordingly. Years later as a CO, I always had IG assistance during practice camps and found it most beneficial. Outsiders were invaluable to assist me in training my unit and I believe that this should be a common and widespread practice throughout the Army.

LEADERS SHOULD BE CAPABLE IN BASICS

Every now and then, COs should put their officers through the ropes as soldiers to confirm that they really do understand what is expected of the troops. This can he alone during competitions, exercises, sports days or more formal annual tests for officers. l have seen this done in unit orientation courses and on inspections. Such mixing it up with the soldiers during training builds understanding, mutual respect and trust. RSMs should do the same with Senior NCOs. If officers and NCOs cannot do the basics, the troops will know it and their credibility will suffer accordingly.

It is vital for the Army to have a high and common standard for the basic skills, which serves as a start point for all soldiers.

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CHALLENGE SOLDIERS

Teach your soldiers that they can do a lot more than they think. Soldiers enjoy a challenge and they will always enjoy challenging others. It is the will to endure and will to win which carries soldiers through the tough situations they will face in operations and war. If they don't experience a significant physical and mental challenge in training they will not know their own capabilities when faced with stressful situations. Confidence and pride come from taking on and conquering challenges, and these are essential qualities of good soldiers. As Churchill said: “Never give in! Never give in! Never, never, never.” Stalwart soldiers, who have been challenged in training will not give in when they are tested with the harsh realities of war or the mental challenges of keeping the peace.

TEACH SUBORDINATES HOW TO TRAIN OTHERS

Spend some thought and energy on the subject of How to Train - or, train the trainers. Not all officers, WOs and NCOs know how to train soldiers. They may be able to do their job as commanders and leaders, but they can learn a lot about how to best train their troops. It is likely that they will only know what they have seen in their own unit, and therefore repeat the bad lessons along with the good. COs should include professional development sessions within their training plans to address the “Training the Trainer” problem. Training must progress beyond the typically unthinking repetition of past experiences. SALY and SALT (same-as-last-year and same-as-last-time) are expressions which should be banished forever from the training lexicon.

“It is the exception to find a commander who teaches his subordinates how to train troops.... very few know anything about it and a great deal of time is wasted in consequence.” 12
- Montgomery

It would seem to me that there should be some sort of course or a significant section in existing courses for officers and NCOs to learn how to train. Perhaps this could be done by distance learning, but my sense is that there needs to be some mentoring. So, perhaps a combination of distance learning and instruction within the brigades/units should be employed. Or, perhaps training would be an appropriate subject for army professional development studies. Certainly the training “lessons learned” should be disseminated on CD-ROM, and these should get to all officers and NCOs.

CONDUCT AFTER-ACTION REVIEWS

Immediately upon completing a training activity the officers and NCOs should conduct “after-action reviews” with the soldiers - beginning with teams, sections and platoons, then with commanders at subsequent higher levels. Some would call it a “Hot Wash” (immediate wash-up). The aim is to encourage dialogue so that all members of the organization being exercised examine their participation in the training event and so that they learn the most appropriate lessons in an open and frank expose. An aide-memoire on some of the key components of the after-action review process may be found at Appendix 2. I would suggest that this is one of the greatest deficiencies in training that I have noticed-we are not good at After-Action Reviews. We are most reluctant to reflect, share ideas, look for the source of the problem and then take remedial action. We seem to not want to embarrass anyone - so consequently we lose many learning opportunities.

RECORD LESSONS LEARNED AND NOTE THE STATE OF EFFICIENCY

It is important that all officers and NCOs periodically reflect on activities and make note of the tactical and the training lessons learned. Record the post-operation and post-exercise lessons. Be brief and to the point - but candid and direct. It is human nature that a one-page summary that can be placed in a notebook is far more likely to engage the mind than a bulky or excessively long post-exercise report. Brigade commanders might wish to review these reports as a means of validating unit training plans as well as providing information to discuss with the CO. It was the historical studies of the German General Staff, which led them to conclude that the mobility of tanks and tractors to create fast moving motorized infantry units would be the key to success in any future war. They studied, practised and perfected these concepts with the limited resources they had at hand, and in the “blitzkrieg” tactics of World War Two we saw the impressive results of such a “learning organization.”

“... the 'Current Reports from Overseas' indicate, the army (British Army, 1942-43) in the Middle East understood what the Germans were doing, but the links within the army's chain of command were not there.... no common doctrinal centre in the army ... no consistent battle doctrine ... no means of ensuring that the many decentralized training programs reflected similar approaches.”
- Millet and Murray
British Military Effectiveness in the Second World War