“Minute research preceded the organization of a campaign, and Napoleon himself issued the final orders on everything. He regarded the long-term preparation and administration of a campaign as vitally important.”
- Montgomery, on Napoleon .
A History of Warfare
Sound planning is vital to achieving effective training, but the peacetime training design in Canada has always been a significant challenge. The seasons, the schooling system, the posting period and the weather have a dramatic effect on what is achievable and when/how the training is conducted. We typically end up with an annual cycle and it is impossible to achieve everything in that cycle. Recognizing the realities of Canada one must determine what is appropriate and achievable, and design the training around that starting with the principal focus, which I believe should be the creation of operationally capable units.
It is the units in the Canadian Army which have kept the profession of arms alive - the regiments and battalions. They have carried the profession through tough times, and still do. It is vital that we get things right at unit level - training being the most important of activities.
Training is the key to creating operationally capable units. At any given point in time, a brigade commander must be able to assess a unit's capability (readiness). This determination will be based on examining the unit's location in its training cycle and measuring the unit against the associated proficiency benchmark (i.e., Battle Task Standards) for that stage of the training cycle. The commander seeks answers to the questions:
The brigade commander must also measure how much “top up” training is required to achieve a specified level of readiness. If asked to prepare a unit to participate in a specific operation, the commander must be able to identify and measure the training gap.
Brigade commanders must issue clear, focused and comprehensive training guidance to COs who then must produce sound training plans based on established priorities and expected standards. COs must take care to avoid trying to do a few exotic and energy-consuming activities when their units have not yet mastered basics skills or met the standards expected.

In a brigade training plan, the brigade commander:
The plan also:
All of this assumes that the commander has received Army and Area direction and has in turn done a training estimate for his formation. It also assumes that the Army has a sound tactical doctrine which leads to realistic battle task standards, which can be translated into objectives. Considerable in-depth thought and reflection needs to go into the front end of the training planning process. Training guidance should:
Assuming limitations in time, resources and training facilities will continue to exist, commanders will be forced to set priorities. I believe that the highest priority training task, with the greatest potential return in operational capability and flexibility, is the training of effective combat teams. Combat teams, made up of elements of infantry, companies, task squadrons and their affiliated artillery of engineer components, are the building blocks of the Canadian Army's capability. COs can train their companies, squadrons and batteries, but the components which give them the greatest operational strength and give the brigade commander the greatest flexibility are the combat teams. Their training under live fire conditions, at least once per year, should be explicitly stated as the minimum acceptable standard across the Army.
Commanders must avoid the long “shopping list” approach in giving direction on training. A few years back we would get a great list of things that needed to be completed in the year, and at each subsequent subordinate headquarters a few more things would be added on. There simply was not enough time in the year to do it all and there was no clear focus. But the higher HQs were “covered” because they told you to do this and that. The other way of training for offensive operations one year and defensive, or whatever, the next was often equally confusing because training years, fiscal years, school years, the posting cycle and the Militia cycle were out of synchronization with each other - and even the staff were confused. So, commanders must reflect, focus and give rational guidance, and the staff should coordinate and synchronize.
It is essential that commanders personally involve themselves in this most important of activities. It cannot be left to the training staffs. Hard decisions must be made and clear and logical direction must be given, and only those in command can do this.
“You must write things down and work through your ideas. If they do not make sense to you, they will not make sense to anybody else, and certainly not to your organization. Your hardest job will be communicating your concept, intent, and objectives.”4
- General Gordon Sullivan and Colonel Michael Harper Hope Is Not A Method
As with leadership, everyone thinks that they understand training and everyone has a responsibility for training, but it is hard to find who is accountable for training. The initiatives to designate an army “training authority” are a start toward putting accountability in place, but if he does not command the units and formations being trained, if that, officer cannot set their agenda, if he cannot control their resources allocated for training, then in the final analysis he cannot be held accountable to produce! trained units and formations. So the best he can do is develop policy, guide individual training, write the doctrine and assist when called upon.
If all agree that training is the most important activity of a peacetime army, then the authority, responsibility and accountability for training must be more clearly articulated, and the ability to influence training must be given to the positions which have the responsibility to produce trained soldiers and units. The lines between those who deliver training and those who are accountable must be more clearly defined.
The commanding officers of battalions and regiments, in my opinion, play the principal role in the actual conduct of training. They are the key individuals in the training activity. Matters may have become a bit fuzzy over the past few years, but in the Canadian Army tradition and practice, “the authority of the commanding officer within his unit is paramount.” (Canadian Army Manual of Unit Administration and Discipline, 1957) 5. The CO is responsible for and should be held accountable for the training of his unit and the soldiers within it.. Montgomery placed “sub-unit efficiency” immediately after the stage management of battle in his order of “lessons learnt”. If companies, platoons, squadrons, troops and batteries lacked the requisite skills, initiative and leader-ship, the best laid higher plan was unlikely to succeed. It is the commanding officers who must train those sub-units.
When General George Kitching was selected to command the Edmonton Regiment in World War II, he wrote down a number of things that he must do. The salient points, in his words, were:
1. I had the responsibility for training all officers just as they had the responsibility for training their men.
2. All officers should be trained to take on the responsibilities of two levels above them, i.e., a platoon commander should be able to be the second-incommand of a company and also command it. Company commanders should be able to be second-in-command of a battalion and also command it.
3. We must expect heavy casualties among our officers and NCOs once we are in action, therefore we must train replacements now; and ensure a steady flow of young officers by encouraging the men to go to officer training units.
4. Once satisfied that an officer knows his job - decentralize and give him his head - it's the best way of learning.
5. Check all faults as they occur - don't let anyone think they can get away with anything.6
General Kitching emphasized training as his principal focus upon taking command and note also, and more importantly, that he clearly understood what he wanted to achieve through training.
An estimate provides an orderly analysis of a problem leading to a reasoned solution. The following figure visually depicts a training estimate. The key components of the estimate are:
The plan is communicated through orders, instructions, directives and commander's guidance, all focussed on achieving the desired end-state. As with all planning, the estimate is cyclical in that as circumstances change the process must be repeated and the plan modified accordingly. To ensure a high degree of flexibility in case circumstances (e.g., mission, resources, time, etc.) change “Branch plans” should also be thought through, and sequel plans should be considered to ensure a seamless follow-on from the plan adopted.

COs must go through this thought process in developing a unit training plan and must discuss this plan with the brigade commander. Perhaps the hardest elements to determine will be the desired end-state (what is required with the time and resources available and other commitments), the centre of gravity (i.e., the key element of the training which will ensure successful achievement of the end-state), and the mission. The brigade commander must ensure that the CO's design for training meets his specified objectives. A discussion between commanders and subordinates will help clarify the intent and guidance, ensuring they have been correctly interpreted and applied.
At least semi-annually, and certainly prior to training for a specific mission, brigade commanders should call for a briefing from COs, who would review the points noted below:
This list above is essentially borrowed from Field Marshal Montgomery's “General Notes on What to Look For When Visiting A Unit”7. It forces a CO to think through and explain the proposed training in a structured and disciplined manner. It also permits the brigade commander to advise and provide additional guidance to the CO prior to the commencement of training. Montgomery wanted to know “what the unit is worth, and if the C.O. knows his job.” I believe that when the above elements are discussed with COs, commanders can soon determine if they know their jobs.
Commanders at all levels must realize that they will face many facts of life in conceiving their training plans. Call these limitations (restraints and constraints), but they have to be dealt with, and perhaps they can be put to advantage. For example:
Regrettably these are some of the limitations commanders will have to work around, and they will ignore them at their peril.
A key factor in developing a training plan is to determine the needs. I would break this factor down into understanding the hierarchy of training, and, understanding who the training audience is. Given. the commander's guidance, the roles/mission, and a clear understanding of the needs of the audience, a commanding officer can focus the estimate and apply scarce resources where they can achieve the greatest impact. A successful training plan will satisfy these needs.
Training typically follows a hierarchy, which might be compared to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. It begins from a broad base (skills and capabilities which every soldier must possess) and then diminishing in numbers until at the top there are only a handful who practice the operational art. The levels of the training hierarchy might be:
The training audience in a unit is never a homogeneous group. There are several audiences with different needs and perceptions, and a clever training plan will accommodate these. For example:
Only with a profound understanding of the hierarchy of training and the needs of the training audience can a commander set out the means by which the training objectives will be achieved. There has to be a clear linkage between the audience and the goals/objectives, and the linkage must be understood by all participants.
After detailed discussions of the training and its underlying philosophy, commanders and their subordinates should arrive at a mutual understanding or agreement (a contractual arrangement if you wish) specifying objectives, milestones, resources and the way that training will be evaluated. They should agree on what the desired end-state would be given the time, resources and focus provided - and both parties should adhere to the undertaking.
Brigade commanders and COs should agree in advance on what is required, what is achievable, and what is to be expected in terms of meaningful training accomplishments. They then establish a “contractual” agreement, stating clearly their respective responsibilities and obligations in order to achieve the “desired end-state”.

Due to resource limitations the best that can be routinely accomplished in terms of multi-purpose combat capability (in absence of a particular mission) may be to train to company or combat team level. If this is the case then that fact should be acknowledged up front, yet the limited training should still be of high quality. Restrictions on' the scope of training should not adversely affect quality.
The brigade commander should take every opportunity to gather information about the unit's progress towards its training objectives. As a key stakeholder in the training contract, the commander must take an active interest (i.e., intellectual curiosity) in the conduct and validity of the unit's training. Visits, indirect observation and other forms of feedback are essential in order tier the commander to develop an informed appreciation and remain abreast of developments.
As a basic principle of supervision/man management, the commander should ensure that the active collection and interpretation of this information does not interfere with the CO's job, nor give him the impression that he does not have the commander's confidence. If the commander feels a mid-course correction is necessary, he need only express his concerns in terms of the training agreement/contract. Governance of unit training will be well served by this arrangement.
At the same time, the CO should seek to engage the sense of purpose and commitment of all soldiers to the training concept and plan. The vision, ultimate intent, mission and campaign plan should be familiar to all members of the unit and every soldier should be able to understand his place in the larger picture. One might ask, what soldiers will give their all to a cause unless they know it is worthy and makes sense, that their own interests are being looked after, and that their team has a chance of success? COs owe it to their soldiers to let them know what they are up to and why. All ranks must understand:
Unquestionably, those who provide support within and to the unit must be engaged in the training plan discussions as early as possible to anticipate requirements, identify obstacles and suggest solutions and alternatives. They may often be left in the background, but their role in support of training is vital, as it is in operations. Being a critical part of the team, they need to be fully engaged.
Once a unit training plan is developed the CO should have discussions with company commanders, similar to those he had with the brigade commander, then provide relevant guidance and direction to his subordinates. The aim of the training, as always, is the creation of an operationally capable unit - all components of the unit and aspects of the unit's operations. The CO has the resources and the responsibility for training the unit, but the company commanders are the ones most intimately engaged in the training.
Much has been said about the CO and his role in training - i.e., his responsibilities, the accountability, how he develops a training plan and his relationship to the brigade commander. Company commanders (and battery and squadron commanders) are much closer to the actual conduct of training and play a major role in its delivery. They have less control over the resources but are more closely in contact with the soldiers. They know the capabilities of their troops and must motivate them, push them and set the example for them. What they may lack in experience and wisdom they more than make up for in enthusiasm and energy. If there are deficiencies, they, the sub-unit commanders, are the ones to put things right through hands-on leadership - personal and up front. As the key leaders who get things done, as well as being the next generation of commanding officer it is critical that they be guided, educated and inspired by their CO.
COs should obviously not be planning unit training without full knowledge of the capabilities of their sub-units and without the total engagement of the sub-unit commanders. It will be through them, the company commanders, that he achieves the quality and intensity of the training he would like and the standards which are required. In the Canadian Army the companies/combat teams are the principal building blocks, but these will only be robust and sound if they are well led by strong company commanders.
Doctrinally, battle procedure is: “the process by which a commander receives his orders, makes his reconnaissance and plan, issues his orders, prepares and deploys his troops and executes his mission”. Battle procedure is something we practice in training but it also something we employ in designing training. In the training process, the battle procedure steps might be:
Such training battle procedure is a vital part of training design, in that it ensures efficiency, economy of effort and thorough co-ordination, plus it exercises one of the most important qualities of operationally effective units - good battle procedure, no matter the task at hand. Sound training in battle procedure also ensures that those who need the time the most, the individual soldiers and section/platoon commanders, are not robbed of the time they need for preparation.
Eliminate the least effective training activities. There will always be a shortage of resources, and of these, time will probably be the most critical. It takes a wise commander to judge the most important training activity and a shrewd one to eliminate the least effective. Having completed the training estimate a conscious effort must be made on concentrating resources and economizing in effort-such that the critical requirements are met.